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WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
V. COMMERCIAL LAW
Application of Promissory Estoppel to UCC Statute of Frauds
In competitive bidding for construction contracts, general contractors solicit
oral price quotes from subcontractors' and then incorporate into the general
contractors' bid on an overall project the lowest price quotations from the
subcontractors. 2 Although the law generally does not require a contractor to
award a subcontract to the lowest bidder,3 the general contractor to whom
a project owner awards a prime contract usually grants subcontracts to the
subcontractors that submitted the lowest estimates.4 A subcontractor, however,
later may attempt to cancel a bid because the subcontractor based the bid
either on erroneous information or on computational mistakes in the estimate.'
1. See Preload Technology, Inc. v. A.B.& J. Constr. Co., 696 F.2d 1080, 1082 (5th Cir.
1983) (general contractor accepted bids from subcontractors for earth work and piping); C.R.
Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 1977) (general contractor asked
supplier to submit sub-bid); Debron Corp. v. National Homes Constr. Corp., 493 F.2d 352, 354
(8th Cir. 1974) (general contractor sought estimates from several steel erectors); McDabco, Inc.
v. Chet Adams Co., 548 F. Supp. 456, 457 (D.S.C. 1982) (plaintiff requested defendant to quote
prices for various items). See generally Closen & Weiland, Construction Industry Bidding Cases:
Application of Traditional Contract, Promissory Estoppel, and Other Theories to the Relations
Between General Contractors and Subcontractors, 13 JOHN MARSHALL L. REv. 565 (1980) (oral
contracts create problems in bids for construction projects).
2. See C & K Eng'g Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 23 Cal. 3d 1, 5, 587 P.2d 1136,
1137, 151 Cal. Rptr. 323, 324 (Cal. 1978) (plaintiff included defendant's low bid in plaintiff's
master bid); Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 152, -, 374
N.E. 2d 306, 307 (App. Ct. 1978) (plaintiff contractor included defendant's low bid figures in
plaintiff's bid for general contract); James King & Son, Inc. v. De Santis Constr. No. 2 Corp.,
97 Misc. 2d 1063, 1065, 413 N.Y.S.2d 78, 79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (contractor incorporated defen-
dant's bid into contractor's overall bid on project).
3. See CALAMARI & PaRMLO, Tnm LAW OF CONTRACTS § 6-9 (2d ed. 1977). Calanari and
Perillo state that courts that apply promissory estoppel hold that the general contractor may
accept or reject the bid although the offer binds the subcontractor. Id.; see Seacoast Elec. Co.
v. Franchi Bros. Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1247, 1249-50 (1st Cir. 1971) (general contractor using
subcontractor's bid in general's bid did not create contract); Cortland Asbestos Prods. v. J.&
K. Plumbing & Heating Co., 33 A.D.2d 11, 12-13, 304 N.Y.S.2d 694, 696 (App. Div. 1969)
(general contractor did not accept subcontractor's bid by merely using bid and subcontractor's
name in contractor's major bid to owner of project). But see Southern Cal. Accoustic Co. v.
C.V. Holder, Inc., 71 Cal. 2d 719, -, 456 P.2d 975, 981, 79 Cal. Rptr. 319, 325 (Cal. 1969)
(contractor bound because of terms of specific statute).
4. See Preload Technology, Inc. v. A.B.& J. Constr. Co., 696 F.2d 1080, 1083 (5th Cir.
1983) (general contractor awarded subcontract to defendant because of defendant's bid lowest);
C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 1977) (general contractor
accepted defendant's low bid and awarded subcontract to defendant); Debron Corp. v. National
Homes Constr. Corp., 493 F.2d 352, 354 (8th Cir. 1974) (general contractor awarded subcontract
to defendant based on defendant's low bid).
5. See, e.g., Saliba-Kringlen Corp. v. Allen Eng'g Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 95, 101, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 799, 801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (defendant's employee should have doubled estimate figures
because employee based bid on half-scale plans); Harry Harris, Inc. v. Quality Constr. Co., 593
S.W.2d 872, 873 (Ky. App. 1979) (supplier failed to include price of five ovens); Anderson Constr.
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In refusing to perform, the subcontractor may claim that the state's statute
of frauds renders the oral promise unenforceable because the parties did not
reduce the contract to writing.6 The general contractor, however, may rely
upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel to circumvent the statute of frauds
writing requirement and sue the subcontractor for any extra amounts the general
contractor expended above the subcontractor's bid price.7 Promissory estop-
pel permits a court to enforce a promise notwithstanding the statute of frauds
when a person makes a promise to a promisee that the promisor should
Co. v. Lyon Metal Prods., 370 So. 2d 935, 936 (Miss. 1979) (bid covered only 306 school lockers
although plans called for 496 lockers). Errors in estimates sometimes occur because a subcontrac-
tor calculates his final bid only hours or even minutes before the general contractor must bid
on an overall project. See C.F. Fedrick, Inc., v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852, 854 (9th
Cir. 1977) (subcontractor submitted bid only ten minutes before general contractor submitted
overall bid); Saliba-Kringlen Corp., 15 Cal. App. 3d at 101, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 801-02 (general
contractor received subcontractor's bid less than two hours before time for submitting master
bid). Suppliers and subcontractors submit their estimates as late as possible to prevent the general
contractor from using the first supplier's bid to persuade another supplier to bid lower than the
first supplier. See Saliba-Kringlen Corp., 15 Cal. App. 3d at 100, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
6. See McDabco, Inc. v. Chet Adams Co., 548 F. Supp. 456, 458 (D.S.C. 1982) (defen-
dant contended that oral bid was unenforceable under South Carolina's version of UCC statute
of frauds); Ivey's Plumbing & Elec. Co. v. Petrochem Maintenance, 463 F. Supp. 543, 549 (N.D.
Miss. 1978) (defendant based motion for summary judgment on sole ground that negotiations
were unenforceable under Mississippi's version of UCC statute of frauds); Tiffany Inc. v. W.M.K.
Transit Mix, 16 Ariz. App. 415, _ 493 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (defendant
filed for summary judgment alleging that oral contract was unenforceable under Arizona's version
of UCC statute of frauds); see also U.C.C. § 2-201 (1978) (statute of frauds provision).
All states except Louisiana have adopted Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code which
contains a statute of frauds section relating to the sale of goods. See Edwards, The Statute of
Frauds of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Doctrine of Estoppel, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 205,
205-06 (1978); see also U.C.C. § 2-201 (1978). Section 2-201 of the UCC states that for a court
to enforce a contract for the sale of goods involving $500 or more, some writing must document
the transaction and the party against whom enforcement is sought must have signed the writing.
See U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1978). Only a few statutory exceptions exist to the UCC's statute of frauds.
See id. § 2-201(2), (3). Section 2-201(2) provides for an exception to the general requirement
of a writing where all parties to the contract are merchants. Id. § 2-201(2). A written confirma-
tion of the oral contract will satisfy the statute of frauds if within a reasonable time the merchant
sends the written confirmation to the other merchant who receives the writing and has reason
to know of the writing's contents. Id. The exception between merchants applies unless the receiv-
ing merchant objects to the contents of the contract in writing with ten days of receipt. Id. Sec-
tion 2-201(3) provides exceptions to the § 2-201(1) writing requirement for contracts for the sale
of specially manufactured goods not suitable for resale, for contracts in which the party against
whom the contract is sought to be enforced admits in the pleadings or in testimony or otherwise
in court that the parties made a contract for sale, and for contracts with respect to goods accepted
and paid for or received and accepted. Id. § 2-201(3).
7. See McDabco, Inc. v. Chet Adams Co., 548 F. Supp. 456, 458 (D.S.C. 1982) (plaintiff
argued that promissory estoppel abrogates South Carolina's version of UCC statute of frauds);
Ivey's Plumbing & Elec. Co. v. Petrochem Maintenance, 463 F. Supp. 543, 550 (N.D. Miss.
1978) (plaintiff argued that Mississippi's version of UCC statute of frauds had no application
when facts justified use of promissory estoppel); Tiffany Inc. v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, 16 Ariz.
App. 415, _ 493 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (plaintiff urged that theory of pro-
missory estoppel provides a defense to statute of frauds); see also infra text accompanying notes
52-113 (discussion of promissory estoppel's application to the UCC statute of frauds).
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reasonably expect to cause the promisee to act or forbear from acting, and
the promisee relies on the promise to his detriment.' The courts are divided
on whether promissory estoppel applies once a state has enacted a version
8. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1981) (promise reasonably inducing
action or forbearance is binding despite statute of frauds); see also id § 90 (promise reasonably
inducing action or forbearance is binding despite lack of consideration for contract). Promissory
estoppel first arose in cases in which courts used the doctrine to enforce promises in charitable
subscription cases. See Metzger and Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Section 2-201 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 26 VmL. L. REv. 63, 78-79 (1980); see also University of S. Cal. v. Bryson,
103 Cal. App. 39, -, 283 P. 949, 954 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1929) (university began construction
of building based on promisor's promise to contribute money toward construction). Other courts
found promissory estoppel useful in enforcing oral promises to make gifts of land when pro-
misees had taken possession and made improvements in reliance on an oral promise from the
owner to make a later gift of the land. Metzger and Phillips, supra, at 79. Many courts, however,
applied the doctrine to gratuitous bailments, gratuitous agency, waivers, rent reductions, and
pensions and bonuses. Id.; see Debron Corp. v. National Homes Constr. Corp., 493 F.2d 352,
356 (8th Cir. 1974) (early cases applied promissory estoppel to gratuitous promises).
The American Law Institute included promissory estoppel as § 90 of the First Restatement
of Contracts. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932). Section 90 stated that a court could
enforce a promise which the promisor should have reasonably expected to induce the promisee
to act or forbear from acting and which did induce the promisee's action or forbearance if a
court could avoid injustice only by enforcing the promise. See id. The same basic idea of § 90
of the First Restatement appears with slight modification in the Second Restatement. See RESTATE-
MENT (SEcotD) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981). Section 90(l) of the Second Restatement states
that a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
on the part of the promisee or a third party and which does induce action of forbearance binds
the promisor if the court can avoid injustice only be enforcing the promise. Id. Section 90(1)
also states that a court may limit the remedy granted to the promisee for breach of the contract
as justice requires. Id.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel, however, enjoyed little popularity until the California
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Drennan v. Star Paving Co. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d
757 (Cal. 1958); cf. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933) (refusing
to allow promissory estoppel in construction bidding situation). In Drennan, a paving contractor
submitted an oral bid over the telephone to a general contractor. 51 Cal. 2d at -, 333 P.2d
at 758. The general contractor used the estimate in making a successful bid on a construction
project for a school district. Id., 333 P.2d at 758. The California Supreme Court held that the
general contractor's reliance on the paving contractor's bid made the bid irrevocable in spite
of the subcontractor's claim that the low bid resulted from a mistake. Id. at __, 333 P.2d at 760-61.
Many other courts subsequently relied on either the Drennan decision or on § 90 of the
First Restatement in reaching similar results in construction bidding cases. See Janke Constr.
Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 527 F.2d 772, 778 (7th Cir. 1976) (courts relied on Drennan and
Restatement § 90 in construing Wisconsin law); Debron Corp. v. National Homes Constr. Corp.,
493 F.2d 352, 356 (8th Cir. 1974) (court relied on § 90 of the Restatement in construing Missouri
law); Air Conditioning Co. of Hawaii v. Richards Constr. Co., 200 F. Supp. 167, 171 (D. Hawaii
1961) (reliance on both Drennan and Restatement § 90 in construing Hawaii law), aff'd on other
grounds, 318 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1963); Reynolds v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 237 Ark. 583, -'
374 S.W.2d 818, 820 (1964) (court relied upon both Drennan and Restatement § 90 in construing
Arkansas law); Norcross v. Winters, 209 Cal. App. 2d 207, -, 25 Cal. Rptr. 821, 827 (Ct.
App. 1962) (court relied on both Drennan and Restatement § 90 in construing California law);
Constructors Supply Co. v. Bostrom Sheet Metal Works, 291 Minn. 113, -, 190 N.W.2d 71,
73,74 (1971) (court relied on both Drennan and § 90 of Restatement in construing Minnesota
law); E.A. Coronis Assoc. v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 90 N.J. Super. 69, 74-77, 216 A.2d 246,
250-51 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966) (court quoted Restatement § 90 and cited with approval
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of the Uniform Commercial Code's (UCC) statute of frauds.' In the recent
case of Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Virginia Metal Industries," the Fourth Cir-
cuit decided that North Carolina law allowed a court to apply promissory
estoppel to cases involving the North Carolina version of the UCC's statute
of frauds."
In Campbell, the plaintiff contractor, Campbell, bid on a Navy construc-
tion project at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. 2 One half-hour before the
Navy's deadline for accepting bids, the defendant subcontractor, Virginia Metal
Industries, telephoned Campbell and quoted a price of 193,121 dollars plus
taxes for the hollow metal doors and frames required for the project. 3 Camp-
bell incorporated the Virginia Metal bid into Campbell's overall bid to per-
form the work."' Subsequently, the Navy awarded the contract to Campbell
as low bidder on the project.' 5 Virginia Metal, however, refused to perform
in accordance with the telephone bid, claiming that the sub-bid included a
price quotation for only part, and not all, of the doors and frames required.' 6
Campbell eventually obtained the necessary items from another supplier at
45,562 dollars more than Virginia Metal's quoted price. 7
Alleging breach of the oral contract, Campbell filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina against Virginia
Metal to recover the 45,562 dollars in increased costs that Campbell paid to
complete the project. 8 Virginia Metal filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, 9 alleging that the contract failed to satisfy the North Carolina Com-
mercial Code's statute of frauds writing requirement. 0 Campbell, however,
argued that the doctrine of promissory estoppel prevented Virginia Metal from
Drennan in construing New Jersey law); cf. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344, 346
(2d Cir. 1933) (case decided prior to Drennan in which court refused to allow promissory estoppel
in construction bidding context).
The trend toward allowing promissory estoppel to circumvent the statute of frauds his gained
momentum with the adoption of § 139 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See Metzger
& Phillips, supra, at 84; see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 139(1) (1981) (enforce-
ment of action by virtue of reliance).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 43-97 (discussion of cases reaching different conclu-
sions on effect of promissory estoppel on UCC statute of frauds).
10. 708 F.2d 930 (4th Cir. 1983).
11. Id. at 934; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201 (1965). The North Carolina Commercial
Code's statute of frauds is identical to the UCC's statute of frauds. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201
(1965); U.C.C. § 2-201 (1978); see also supra note 6 (provisions of UCC statute of frauds).
12. 708 F.2d at 930.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 931.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 930-31.
17. Id. at 931.
18. Id.
19. Joint Appendix of Appellant and Appellee at 1, 10; Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Virginia
Metal Indus., 708 F.2d 930 (4th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix]; see FED. R.
Crv. P. 12(c) (motion for judgment on pleadings).
20. Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 7-8; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201 (1965) (North
Carolina Commercial Code's statute of frauds).
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denying the existence of the contract.2 ' Nonetheless, the district court rejected
Campbell's argument and held that a contractor must have a subcontractor's
written proposal satisfying the statute of frauds before the contractor may
act in reliance on the subcontractor's proposal.22 The district court also noted
that a previous case interpreting North Carolina law held that estoppel might
prevent enforcement of the statute of frauds only when the party asserting
the breach of an oral contract proved fraud on the part of the party relying
on the statute of frauds.23 The district court then granted Virginia Metal's
motion for judgment on the pleadings because Campbell did not allege that
Virginia Metal committed any fraud.2 "
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, both Campbell and Virginia Metal con-
ceded that no direct North Carolina authority recognized or refuted the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel.2 1 After the parties' oral arguments to the Fourth
Circuit, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court explicitly stated in
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish26 that the doctrine of promissory estop-
pel always had existed as part of North Carolina law.27 The Fourth Circuit
21. Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 3.
22. Id. at 92; see N.C. GEM. STAT. § 25-2-201 (1965) (North Carolina's version of UCC
statute of frauds). But see infra text accompanying note 109 (commercially impracticable to re-
quire contractors to have written bids from subcontractors before relying on bids).
23. Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 91; see Davis v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 483
F.2d 1014, 1016 (4th Cir. 1973) (promissory estoppel applies only when fraud alleged).
24. Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 92.
25. Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Virginia Metal Indus., 708 F.2d 930, 931 (4th Cir. 1983).
In diversity of citizenship cases such as Campbell, the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
requires a federal court to follow the applicable cases and statutes from the state whose law
controlled the transaction or activity. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see C. WRIGHT, THE LAw OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 55, at 354 (4th ed. 1983) (Erie doctrine requires federal court to follow applicable
rules and court decisions from state whose law controls the transaction litigated). If no state
law exists on the particular point involved, the federal court must choose a rule that the federal
court believes the state court would adopt in the same situation. WRIGHT, supra, § 55, at 354.
26. 306 N.C. 417, 293 S.E.2d 749 (1982).
27. Id. at 427, 293 S.E.2d at 756. In Wachovia Bank, the bank as executor of an estate
brought an action against a tenant for ejectment and damages because the tenant had failed to
comply with provisions of a lease requiring written notice of intention to extend the lease. Id.
at 418-19, 293 S.E.2d at 751. The defendant Rubish proposed three grounds on which promissory
estoppel barred the executor from asserting the requirement of a written notice to renew the
lease. Id. Rubish claimed promissory estoppel applied because the deceased had waived the writ-
ten notice requirement before dying, the executor had actual oral notice of Rubish's intent to
renew the lease, and the executor failed to notify Rubish to direct written notice to the bank
as trustee. Id. The bank appealed from the lower court's dismissal of the case and from the
North Carolina Court of Appeals' decision that the lower court committed no error. Id. On
appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that to prove the elements of promissory estop-
pel the defendant must show an express or implied promise by the plaintiff and that the defen-
dant detrimentally relied on the plaintiff's promise. Id. at 427, 293 S.E.2d at 756. The Wachovia
Bank court distinguished promissory estoppel from equitable estoppel. Id. The North Carolina
court noted that equitable estoppel requires proof of an actual misrepresentation and reliance
whereas promissory estoppel requires an express or implied promise and a showing of detrimental
reliance on that promise. Id., 293 S.E.2d at 755-56; see supra text accompanying note 23 (Davis
case held promissory estoppel applicable only when fraud alleged).
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noted the Wachovia Bank decision and cited with approval a statement by
the North Carolina Supreme Court that promissory estoppel requires an ex-
press or implied promise by a promisor and reliance on the promise by the
promisee. 28 The Campbell court stated that the facts as pleaded by Campbell
clearly presented a case providing all of the elements of the doctrine of pro-
missory estoppel and that Virginia Metal's oral promise bound Virginia Metal
to provide Campbell with the contract items at the quoted price. 9
The Fourth Circuit then examined whether the doctrine of promissory
estoppel could render ineffective North Carolina's version of the UCC statute
of frauds." The North Carolina statute of frauds requires a writing to docu-
ment a contract for the sale of good costing more than 500 dollars.3 The
Fourth Circuit, however, noted that the general principles section of the North
Carolina version of the UCC states that the principles of law and equity, in-
cluding the law of estoppel, supplement the North Carolina commercial code
unless particular provisions of the code displace those principles.32 The Fourth
28. Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Virginia Metal Indus., 708 F.2d 930, 931 (4th Cir. 1983);
see Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., v. Rubish, 306 N.C. 417, 427, 293 S.E.2d 749, 756 (promissory
estoppel requires express or implied promise by promisor and detrimental reliance on promise
by promisee).
29. 708 F.2d at 932. The Fourth Circuit noted that when an appellate court reviews a deci-
sion of a district court in which the district court disposed of the case by awarding judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) or 12(c), the appellate court must assume the truth
of all of the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact. Id. at 930-31; FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)
(defenses which pleader may assert by motion rather than in responsive pleading); FED. R. Civ.
P. 12(c) (motion for judgment on pleadings); see also Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof
Glass Corp., 706 F.2d 456, 457 (4th Cir. 1983) (facts as stated accepted as true on rule 12(b)
(6) motion). In Campbell, Virginia Metal's answer denied that Virginia Metal made the quotation
to supply all of the hollow metal doors and frames required for the job. 708 F.2d at 930 n.
1. The Fourth Circuit noted that on a rule 12(b) or 12(c) motion, the court may not take a denial
into account. Id. The Fourth Circuit stated that the facts as pleaded in the plaintiff's complaint
control and that Campbell unambiguously had pleaded both the promise and Campbell's detrimental
reliance on the promise. Id.
30. 708 F.2d at 932; see N.C. GEM. STAT. § 25-2-201 (1965) (North Carolina's version of
UCC statute of frauds); supra note 6 (discussion of UCC statute of frauds and statutory excep-
tions to statute of frauds).
31. See N.C. GEM. STAT. § 25-2-201 (1965).
32. 708 F.2d at 932; see N.C. GEN. STAT § 25-1-103 (1965). The North Carolina legislature
patterned the state commercial code's supplementary general principles provision after the UCC's
supplementary general principles provision. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-103 (1965); U.C.C. §
1-103 (1978). The general principles section states that unless specific sections of the UCC displace
the general principles of law, the general principles shall supplement the provisions of the UCC.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-103 (1965); U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978). The general principles of law
recognized in § 1-103 comprise the principles of law and equity including the law relative to the
law merchant, the capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation,
duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-1-103 (1965); U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978).
One commentator has noted that although the UCC explicitly provides a statute of frauds,
the code does not contain a similar statement of how courts should apply promissory estoppel
to supplement the code. See Edwards, supra note 6, at 219. Edwards states that the supplemental
general principles provision of UCC § 1-103 does not contain rules for determining when a par-
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Circuit stated that in considering the effect of promissory estoppel on North
Carolina's version of the UCC statute of frauds, the court must determine
whether promissory estoppel created an exception to the statute of frauds or
whether the statute of frauds displaced the doctrine of promissory estoppel."
After noting the supplementary general principles provision of the North
Carolina commercial code, the Fourth Circuit stated that courts have taken
divergent views on the issue of the effect of promissory estoppel on the UCC's
statute of frauds. 3' Although the Fourth Circuit observed that North Carolina
had not adopted explicitly the use of promissory estoppel in UCC statute of
frauds cases, the Fourth Circuit found persuasive the Wachovia Bank court's
approval of section 139 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts." Section
ticular UCC section displaces the general principles of law and equity. Id. Edwards also notes
that neither UCC § 2-201 nor its accompanying comments contain any express statement indicating
the intent of the drafters as to whether the statute of frauds displaced the law of promissory
estoppel. Id. Other authorities state that promissory estoppel exists independently of the UCC
although the courts may apply the doctrine to cases involving the UCC when necessary. See J.
W TrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5,
at 19 (2d ed. 1980) (supplemental general principles remain largely intact under UCC and serve
to create exceptions to UCC sections or otherwise modify the statute); CALAMARI & PERILLO,
supra note 3, § 1-7 (traditional rules prevail where UCC is silent).
33. See 708 F.2d at 932.
34. Id. at 932-33. The Fourth Circuit cited many cases in which courts confronted the issue
of whether promissory estoppel provides an exception to the statute of frauds. Id. Many of the
cases the Fourth Circuit cited reached the conclusion that promissory estoppel may provide relief
from the harsh effects of the UCC's statute of frauds. See R.S. Bennett & Co. v. Economy
Mechanical Indus., 606 F.2d 182, 187 (7th Cir. 1979) (Illinois law allows promissory estoppel
recovery to succeed notwithstanding UCC statute of frauds); Ralston Purina Co. v. McCollum,
271 Ark. 840, 841, 611 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981) (promissory estoppel prevents
party from asserting UCC statute of frauds); Warder & Lee Elev. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339,
342 (Iowa 1979) (UCC § 2-201 does not displace doctrine of promissory estoppel); Decatur Coop.
Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, -, 547 P.2d 323, 329-30 (1976) (promissory estoppel available
to defeat UCC statute of frauds); Jamestown Terminal Elev. v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736, 740-41
(N.D. 1976) (promissory estoppel may bar raising UCC statute of frauds defense). Many other
cases, however, have reached the opposite conclusion that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
may not abrogate the UCC statute of frauds. See C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp.,
552 F.2d 852, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1977) (promissory estoppel does not defeat California Commercial
Code's statute of frauds); Tiffany Inc. v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, 16 Ariz. App. 415, -, 493
P.2d 1220, 1226 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (court may not apply promissory estoppel when case is
clearly within UCC statute of frauds); C. G. Campbell & Son, Inc. v. Comdeq Corp., 586 S.W.2d
40, 40-41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (court denied use of promissory estoppel citing only § 2-201 of
UCC with no discussion of § 1-103 or Restatement); Anderson Constr. Co. v. Lyon Metal Prods.,
370 So. 2d 935, 936-37 (Miss. 1979) (court rejected use of promissory estoppel when bid lower
than other bids received); Wilke v. Holdrege Coop. Equity Exch., 200 Neb. 803, _ 265 N.W.2d
672, 674-75 (1978) (court held promissory estoppel inapplicable in UCC § 2-201 situation but
did not discuss § 1-103); Edward Joy Co. v. Noise Control Prods., 111 Misc. 2d 64, 65, 443
N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (court rejected promissory estoppel argument when plaintiff
relied upon bid containing substantial error that should have prompted plaintiff's inquiry); Lige
Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 96 Wash. 2d 291, 299-300, 635 P.2d 103, 107 (1981)
(court held that promissory estoppel did not apply in Washington to defeat effect of UCC statute
of frauds).
35. 708 F.2d at 933; ste Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 306 N.C. 417, 433, 293
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139 states that a court may enforce a promise notwithstanding the statute of
frauds when a promisor makes a promise to a promisee that the promisor
reasonably should expect to cause the promisee to act or forbear from acting,
and the promisee relies upon the promise to his detriment. 36 Section 139 also
states that courts may apply promissory estoppel to enforce a promise if en-
forcing the promise provides the only method of avoiding injustice.3 7 The
Fourth Circuit noted that many of the courts that have found that promissory
estoppel creates an exception to the UCC statute of frauds writing require-
ment have relied upon section 139.38 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the
doctrine of promissory estoppel would prevent Virginia Metal from asserting
the statute of frauds to deny Campbell's recovery for the breach of Virginia
Metal's oral contract. 39 The Campbell court, therefore, reversed and remanded
as erroneous the district court's decision granting judgment on the pleadings
to Virginia Metal.
40
In contrast to Campbell, a minority of courts have not applied promissory
estoppel to cases involving state versions of the UCC statute of frauds. 41 Many
S.E.2d 749, 759 (1982) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1981)); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1981) (doctrine of promissory estoppel abrogates
harsh effects of statute of frauds); supra note 27 (discussion of Wachovia Bank).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1981); see id. § 90 (promise inducing
action or forbearance from action is binding); supra note 8 (discussion of RESTATEMENT (SE-
COND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981)).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1981).
38. 708 F.2d at 933; see Debron Corp. v. National Homes Constr. Corp., 493 F.2d 352,
356 (8th Cir. 1974) (adopting rationale of § 90 of First Restatement); Warder & Lee Elev. v.
Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339, 342-43 (Iowa 1979) (adopting rationale of § 217A in Tentative Drafts
which become § 139 in final form).
39. 708 F.2d at 934.
40. Id. The Fourth Circuit rejected Virginia Metal's claim that Davis v. Crown Central
controlled the transaction involved in Campbell. Id. n.6; see supra note 23 and accompanying
text (trial court's opinion that Davis applied to instant case); Davis v. Crown Cent. Petroleum,
483 F.2d 1014, 1016 (4th Cir. 1973) (North Carolina law allows application of estoppel only
when party alleges fraud). In Davis Crown Central Petroleum made oral agreements to supply
the plaintiff independent oil dealers with the dealers' gasoline requirements. 483 F.2d at 1015.
As the oil shortage developed, Crown Central refused to make any further deliveries to the in-
dependent oil dealers. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Davis held that the oral contracts to furnish
gasoline were unenforceable under the statute of frauds. Id. at 1016. The Davis court stated
that in exceptional cases, courts of equity will find an estoppel against the enforcement of the
statute of frauds but that such an estoppel could arise in North Carolina only upon a showing
of fraud committed by the party relying upon the statute. Id.
The Fourth Circuit in Campbell noted that in Davis the plaintiff oil dealers had failed to
make any promissory estoppel argument. Campbell, 708 F.2d at 934 n.6. The Campbell court
commented that even if the Davis oil dealers had argued promissory estoppel, the claim would
have failed because of no showing of reliance on a promise or a change in position to the oil
dealers' detriment. Id. The Campbell court stated that the Davis opinion, therefore, referred
to equitable estoppel which requires a showing of fraud to defeat the effect of the statute of
frauds. Id. The Campbell court noted that promissory estoppel does not require a showing of
fraud to escape the strictures of the statute. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 23 (district
court's opinion that estoppel might prevent enforcement of statute of frauds only upon showing
of fraud).
41. See Ivey's Plumbing & Elec. Co. v. Petrochem Maintenance, 463 F. Supp. 543, 552-54
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courts have held that the terms of the UCC statute of frauds do not allow
recourse to the doctrine of promissory estoppel and that the statutory excep-
tions listed in the statute of frauds provide the only conditions under which
the parties can avoid the effects of the statute.4 2 For example, in McDabco,
Inc. v. Chet Adams Co., 3 the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina held that under the express terms of South Carolina's ver-
sion of the UCC statute of frauds, plaintiff, McDabco, Inc., could not use
promissory estoppel to defeat the statute of frauds writing requirement. '
McDabco had included the defendant Chet Adams Company's oral price quota-
tions for certain parts in McDabco's own bid on a mechanical services
contract. 5 Adams, however, refused to sell the items to McDabco when a
dispute arose over the number of items included in the bid.4 6 The McDabco
court noted that the statute of frauds provided several specific exceptions to
the statute's strict writing requirement.47 The court concluded that the statute's
specific exceptions to the writing requirement indicated that the legislature
intended the statute of frauds to provide the only exceptions to the requirements
of a written contract for sale." s
While some courts reject the application of promissory estoppel to cases
involving a state's version of the UCC's statute of frauds because of the limited
exceptions stated in the statute, other courts reach the same result by finding
that allowing promissory estoppel to operate in cases involving the UCC's
statute of frauds effectively would negate the statute's writing requirement.49
(N.D. Miss. 1978) (Mississippi law does not allow promissory estoppel in statute of frauds case);
C.G. Campbell & Son, Inc. v. Comdeq Corp., 586 S.W.2d 40, 40-41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (UCC
§ 2-201(2) provides only methods of alleviating the hardships of § 2-201(1) statute of frauds);
Wilke v. Holdrege Coop. Equity Exch., 200 Neb. 803, -, 265 N.W.2d 672, 675 (1978) (pro-
missory estoppel unavailable to defeat UCC statute of frauds); -Edward Joy Co. v. Noise Control
Prods., 111 Misc. 2d 64, 65-66, 443 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (court refused to apply
promissory estoppel to defeat § 2-201 claimed defense where defendant made mathematical mistake);
Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 96 Wash. 2d 291, 299, 635 P.2d 103, 107 (Wash.
1981) (promissory estoppel unavailable to abrogate statute of frauds because UCC adopted to
provide uniformity among jurisdictions).
42. See Ivey's Plumbing & Elec. Co. v. Petrochem Maintenance, 463 F. Supp. 543, 553
(N.D. Miss. 1978) (Mississippi courts look disfavorably upon non-statutory exceptions to writing
requirement of statute of frauds); McDabco, Inc. v. Chet Adams Co., 548 F. Supp. 456, 461
(D.S.C. 1982) (legislature provided only exceptions to § 2-201(1) in § 2-201(2) and § 2-201(3));
C.G. Campbell & Son, Inc. v. Comdeq Corp., 586 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (limited
relief of § 2-201(2) is all legislature was willing to grant); see also U.C.C. § 2-201(2),(3) (1978)
(statutory exceptions to UCC statute of frauds writing requirement); supra note 6 (discussing
statutory exceptions to UCC § 2-201(1) statute of frauds).
43. 548 F. Supp. 456 (D.S.C. 1982).
44. Id. at 461.
45. Id. at 457.
46. Id. at 458.
47. Id. at 461; see U.C.C. § 2-201(2), (3) (1978) (specific statutory exceptions to UCC §
2-201(1)); see also supra note 6 (discussion of statutory exceptions to UCC § 2-201(1)).
48. 548 F. Supp. at 461.
49. See C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852, 857 (9th Cir. 1977) (Califor-
nia courts would not allow promissory estoppel to render § 2-201(l) and (2) a nullity); McDabco,
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For example, in C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp.," the Ninth Circuit
determined that extending promissory estoppel to California's version of the
UCC's statute of frauds would nullify the statute.' The plaintiff, C.R. Fedrick,
Inc., asked defendant, Borg-Warner Corp., to bid on some pumps necessary
for a government project on which Fedrick intended to bid.52 Fedrick reduced
the bid to the government by 200,000 dollars because Borg-Warner's bid was
more than 450,000 dollars lower than the next lowest bid. 3 After the govern-
ment awarded the prime contract to Fedrick, Fedrick granted the subcontract
to Borg-Warner. 4 Borg-Warner, however, later expressed concern to Fedrick
that the pumps would fail to meet the government's specifications." Borg-
Warner offered to modify the pumps and sell the modified pumps to Fedrick
at an increased price.16 Fedrick refused to pay any price increase for the
modified pumps and stated that Fedrick had incorporated Borg-Warner's
original price into the Fedrick bid.5 7 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that
application of promissory estoppel would render California's version of the
UCC statute of frauds a nullity because allowing promissory estoppel would
mean that the statute's writing requirement never would apply.58 Although
the California cases had applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel to cases
involving oral bids for the sale of both work and materials, those cases had
not considered the California version of the UCC statute of frauds nor did
the California version of the UCC statute of frauds apply.5 9 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, therefore, held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel did not bar the
defendant Borg-Warner from relying upon the California version of the UCC's
statute of frauds writing requirement.
6
1
Although most courts that deny the application of promissory estoppel
Inc. v. Chet Adams Co., 548 F. Supp. 456, 461 (D.S.C. 1982) (to allow promissory estoppel
would nullify § 2-201); Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 111-12, 289 So. 2d 609, 613 (1974) (to allow
promissory estoppel would nullify statute of frauds); Farmland Serv. Coop. v. Klein, 196 Neb.
538, 542-45, 244 N.W.2d 86, 90 (1976) (permitting promissory estoppel would render statute of
frauds meaningless); Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil of Cal., 96 Wash. 2d 291, 299-300, 635
P.2d 103, 107 (1981) (adopting promissory estoppel would allow parties to circumvent UCC).
50. 552 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1977); see Note, Promissory Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds
in California, 66 CAL. L. REv. 1219, 1220 (1978) (suggesting that California courts will not follow
Fedrick because Ninth Circuit incorrectly decided Fedrick). See generally, Note, Contracts - Pro-
missory Estoppel and the UCC Statute of Frauds - Subcontractor Is Not Estopped to Assert
the Statute of Frauds Despite General Contractor's Reliance on Oral Sub-bid in Calculating the
Prime Bid, 48 Miss. L.J. 883 (1977) (discussion of Fedrick decision and promissory estoppel's
effect on the UCC statute of frauds).
51. 552 F.2d at 856-57.





57. Id. at 854-55.
58. Id. at 856-57.
59. Id. at 856.
60. Id. at 858.
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to UCC cases rely on the lack of a specific promissory estoppel exception
in the UCC statute of frauds or state that to apply promissory estoppel would
negate the UCC statute of frauds writing requirement, some courts follow
precedential case law holding promissory estoppel unavailable in any statute
of frauds case. 6' For example, in Ivey's Plumbing & Electric Co. v. Petrochem
Maintenance, Inc.,62 Ivey's incorporated Petrochem's oral price quotation for
five air compressors into Ivey's successful bid on a government project.
63
Petrochem later refused to perform at the price quoted to Ivey's because
Petrochem's supplier, Gardner-Denver Company, issued a revised price on
the compressors and refused to perform under an earlier lower quote to
Petrochem.6 4 Ivey's sued Petrochem and Gardner-Denver in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Mississippi to recover the increased costs
of obtaining the compressors from another supplier.6 1 Petrochem asserted a
cross-claim against the supplier for any amounts which Petrochem might have
owed to Ivey's. 66 Gardner-Denver moved from summary judgment, asserting
that Mississippi's version of the UCC's statute of frauds rendered unenforceable
61. See Ivey's Plumbing & Elec. Co. v. Petrochem Maintenance, 463 F. Supp. 543, 552-54
(N.D. Miss. 1978) (Mississippi Supreme Court has exhibited unfavorable attitude toward judicial-
ly created exceptions to other statutes); Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 111-12, 289 So. 2d 609, 613
(1974) (followed twenty-year-old case without attempting to distinguish or analyze earlier opinion);
Wilke v. Holdrege Coop. Equity Exch., 200 Neb. 803, -, 265 N.W.2d 672, 674-75 (1978)
(followed cases stating promissory estoppel to be inapplicable to any case involving statute of
frauds). At least one court distinguished previous state court decisions supporting the use of pro-
missory estoppel because the previous decisions applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel to
cases involving both work and materials rather than goods alone. See C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-
Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1977). In Fedrick, the Ninth Circuit anticipated
that the Supreme Court of California would not extend the rule of Drennan v. Star Paving Co.
to a situation involving the sale of goods only. Id.; see Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal.
2d 409, -, 333 P.2d 757, 760-61 (1958); supra note 8 (discussion of Drennan). Another court
distinguished previous case authority allowing the use of promissory estoppel in a statute of frauds
context because the previous case did not arise under the UCC. See C.G. Campbell & Son, Inc.
v. Comdeq Corp., 586 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (distinguishing non-UCC case authority);
Meade Constr. Co. v. Mansfield Commercial Elec., 579 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Ky. 1979) (court allow-
ed use of promissory estoppel in non-UCC context). In Comdeq, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
cited to the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Meade Constr. Co. v. Mansfield Commercial
Elec., 579 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Ky. 1979), which held that an oral bid for a contract should bind
a subcontractor when the subcontractor reasonably should foresee that the general contractor
would rely on the sub-bid in the formulation of an overall bid. 586 S.W.2d at 41. The Comdeq
court rejected Meade because Meade did not discuss the effect of the UCC's statute of frauds.
586 S.W.2d at 41; see Meade Constr. Co. v. Mansfield Commercial Elec., 579 S.W.2d 105, 106
(Ky. 1979) (promissory estoppel allowed to operate in non-UCC statute of frauds case). See also
Roeder, Commercial Law, 69 Ky. L. REV. 517 (1981) (discussing Comdeq case); cf. Harry Har-
ris, Inc. v. Quality Constr. Co., 593 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (court applied pro-
missory estoppel to case involving sale of goods where appellant failed to assert Kentucky's ver-
sion of UCC statute of frauds).
62. 463 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
63. Id. at 545.
64. See id. at 545-48.
65. Id. at 545.
66. Id. at 548.
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the oral contract between Petrochem and Gardner-Denver.67 The district court
held that Mississippi case law strongly disfavored judicially created exceptions
to the statute of frauds and that Mississippi courts consistently had rejected
attempts to avoid the plain statutory language of the statute of frauds. 6" The
courts thus refused to allow the application of promissory estoppel to defeat
the UCC statute of frauds defense.
69
Of the decisions that have held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
does not apply to cases involving the UCC's statute of frauds, many have
failed to note the UCC's supplementary general principles provision."0 At least
one court has noted the general principles section but failed to discuss the
general principles section's possible effect on the UCC's statute of frauds. 7'
The supplementary general principles provision of the UCC and similar or
duplicate provisions of the state codes state that the principles of law and
equity, including the law of estoppel, supplement the UCC unless particular
provisions of the UCC displace those principles.72 In Lige Dickson Co. v. Union
Oil Co. of California,3 the Washington Supreme Court noted the general prin-
ciples provision of Washington's version of the UCC but reached no conclu-
67. Id.
68. Id. at 552.
69. Id. at 554.
70. See generally C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1977);
McDabco, Inc. v. Chet Adams Co., 548 F. Supp. 456 (D.S.C. 1982); Ivey's Plumbing & Elec.
Co. v. Petrochem Maintenance, 463 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Tiffany Inc. v. W.M.K.
Transit Mix, 16 Ariz. App. 415, 493 P.2d 1220 (1972); C.G. Campbell & Son, Inc. v. Comdeq
Corp., 586 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Anderson Constr. Co. v. Lyon Metal Prods., 370
So.2d 935 (Miss. 1979); Wilke v. Holdrege Coop. Equity Exch., 200 Neb. 803, 265 N.W.2d 672
(1978).
71. See Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 96 Wash. 2d 291, 297-98, 635 P.2d
103, 106 (Wash. 1981) (although court mentioned § 1-103 in footnote, court failed to reach any
conclusion as to effect of § 1-103 on § 2-201 statute of frauds).
72. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978). Professors White and Summers call the general principles provi-
sion the most important single provision in the UCC. See Wmr & SUoMaERs, supra note 32,
§ 5, at 19. Professors White and Summers note that although the UCC sections generally displace
prior legal principles, the UCC sections have no effect on equitable principles. Id. White and
Summers also state that the general equitable principles remain intact under the UCC and serve
to create exceptions to the UCC sections or otherwise modify the statute. Id. Professors White
and Summers state that the general principles provision imposes on the court an affirmative duty
to reach an equitable result unless the UCC displaces the relevant equitable general principles. Id.
Professor Summers suggests that judges will reach equitable results in accordance with the
UCC if the judges consider the followingissues in order. See Summers, General Equitable Prin-
ciples Under Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Nw. L. REv. 906, 945-46 (1978).
First, which specific UCC sections apply or appear to apply? Id. at 945. Second, would the ap-
plication of the UCC section bring about an inequity between the parties? Id. Third, if the result
appears inequitable, do general equitable principles apply under § 1-103 of the UCC or do the
relevant UCC sections displace all such principles? Id. at 946. Fourth, if the specific sections
do not displace the general equitable principles, which of the general principles come into play?
Id. Fifth, does the non-UCC law repudiate the principle, and, if so, should the court reject the
repudiation? Id. Sixth, if the non-UCC law does not repudiate the principle, how should the
court apply the principle to avoid an inequitable result between the parties? Id.
73. 96 Wash. 2d 291, 635 P.2d 103 (Wash. 1981).
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sion as to the general principles section's effect on Washington's version of
the UCC statute of frauds.7 ' Lige Dickson had previously purchased liquid
asphalt exclusively from Union Oil in transactions that always took place over
the telephone.15 As the price of asphalt increased dramatically, Union Oil
granted Lige Dickson an oral guarantee against further price increases. 6 Subse-
quently, Union Oil reneged on the oral promise not to increase the price of
asphalt."' Lige Dickson filed suit against Union Oil in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington to recover the increased costs
Lige Dickson expended to acquire the liquid asphalt necessary to complete
the plaintiff's existing contracts." The trial court held that Washington's ver-
sion of the UCC statute of frauds rendered the oral contract unenforceable
because the statute required the parties to reduce the contract to writing.
7 9
Lige Dickson appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which certified
the question to the Washington Supreme Court.8 Although the Washington
Supreme Court noted the supplementary general principles provision of the
Washington statute and discussed some of the cases interpreting the section,
the court failed to make any conclusion as to the section's effect on
Washington's version of the UCC statute of frauds."' The Washington Supreme
Court expressed a fear of increased confusion and litigation if the court ap-
plied promissory estoppel in cases involving the UCC statute of frauds.82 The
court, therefore, rejected the use of promissory estoppel in UCC cases.83
Unlike the Lige Dickson court, a majority of courts have held that the
UCC's supplementary general principles provision does permit a court to apply
promissory estoppel to cases involving the UCC's statute of frauds. 84 For
74. See id. at 297-98, 635 P.2d at 106-07.
75. Id. at 292, 635 P.2d at 103.
76. Id. at 293, 635 P.2d at 103-04.
77. Id., 635 P.2d at 104.
78. Id. at 294, 635 P.2d at 104.
79. Id.; see WASU. REV. CODE § 62A.2-201 (1965) (Washington's version of UCC statute
of frauds).
80. 96 Wash. 2d at 294, 635 P.2d at 104.
81. See id. at 297-98, 635 P.2d at 106-07.
82. Id. at 299, 635 P.2d at 107.
83. Id.
84. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 8, at 93 (substantial weight of authority supports
proposition that some form of estoppel applies to UCC § 2-201); U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978) (UCC's
supplementary general principles provision). Many of the cases holding that promissory estoppel
applies to cases involving the UCC statute of frauds have arisen from oral contracts between
a general contractor and a materialman or supplier. See R.S. Bennett & Co. v. Economy Mechanical
Indus., 606 F.2d 182, 186-89 (7th Cir. 1979) (promissory estoppel applied to case in which sewage
pumps dealer sued mechanical subcontractor for breach of oral contract); Jenkins & Boler Co.
v. Schmidt Iron Works, 36 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 104648, 344 N.E.2d 275, 278-79 (Il. App. Ct.
1976) (promissory estoppel binds subcontractor to written bid for goods worth over $500 when
bid failed to meet UCC statute of frauds requirement of specifying quantity of goods); Maryland
Supreme Corp. v. Blake Co., 279 Md. 531, 548-50, 369 A.2d 1017, 1028-29 (1977) (lower court
should determine if defendant is estopped to assert UCC statute of frauds). At other times the
controversy developed from a sale of crops or other farm goods. See Robert Johnson Grain
Co. v. Chemical Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 211 (8th Cir. 1976) (summary judgment wrong
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example, in Warder & Lee Elevator v. Britten,8" the Iowa Supreme Court held
that under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the plaintiff could recover
for breach of an oral contract despite the defendant's contention that the writing
requirement of Iowa's version of the UCC statute of frauds rendered the oral
contract unenforceable." In Britten, the plaintiff, Warder & Lee Elevator,
Inc., orally agreed to purchase 4,000 bushels of corn and 2,000 bushels of
soybeans from Britten. 7 A few days later, Warder & Lee sold the same quan-
tities of corn and beans to other elevators. 88 The price of grain subsequently
increased substantially, and Britten refused to deliver the grain to Warder &
Lee at the agreed price. 89 Warder & Lee sued Britten for the increased costs
in obtaining from other sources the corn and soybeans necessary to fulfill
Warder & Lee's contracts for sale to other grain elevators.90 Britten contended
at trial that Iowa's version of the UCC statute of frauds rendered the oral
contract with the elevator unenforceable. 9' The trial court ruled that Iowa
law permitted the application of promissory estoppel in cases involving the
Iowa version of the UCC statute of frauds.92
On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court noted that Iowa had long recognized
promissory estoppel as a means of defeating the state's general statute of
frauds. 93 The Britten court stated that the UCC statute of frauds exceptions
listed in the same statute were purely definitional and did not purport to
eliminate the legal and equitable principles traditionally applicable in contracts
actions. 94 The Britten court found that the Iowa statute of frauds did not
displace the principle of estoppel described in the UCC supplementary general
when possible for promissory estoppel to abrogate statute of frauds); Warder & Lee Elev. v.
Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339, 341-44 (Iowa 1979) (UCC § 1-103 makes doctrine of promissory estop-
pel available against UCC statute of frauds claim); Decatur Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan.
171, 176-80, 547 P.2d 323, 329-30 (1976) (promissory estoppel doctrine available to defeat UCC
§ 2-201 statute of frauds defense); Jamestown Terminal Elev. v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736, 740-42
(N.D. 1976) (promissory estoppel acts as bar to raising statute of frauds in case of oral contract
for sale of goods); Potter v. Hatter Farms, Inc., 641 P.2d 628, 632 (Or. 1982) (§ 1-103 allows
promissory estoppel because legislature did not specifically displace the doctrine in § 2-201); Farmers
Elev. Co. v. Lyle, 90 S.D. 86, 91-93, 238 N.W.2d 290, 293-94 (1976) (§ 1-103 allows an estoppel
to prevent raising of § 2-201 statute of frauds). Sometimes, the controversy developed through
the breach of an oral contract for sale of new or used equipment. See Meylor v. Brown, 281
N.W.2d 632, 634-35 (Iowa 1979) (promissory estoppel applies to UCC § 2-201 with same force
as it does to other Iowa statutes); Fairway Mach. Sales Co. v. Continental Motors Corp., 40
Mich. App. 270, 272, 198 N.W.2d 757, 757-58 (1972) (remanded for determination of factual
issues involving promissory estoppel in UCC statute of frauds case).
85. 274 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1979).
86. Id. at 340.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 341.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.; see IovA CODE ANN. § 554.2201 (West 1967) (Iowa's version of UCC statute of
frauds).
92. 274 N.W.2d at 340.
93. Id. at 342.
94. Id.
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principles provision." The court stated that a contrary decision would mean
that a court could not enforce any oral contract coming within the terms of
the statute of frauds despite fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, dishonesty or
any other form of unconscionable conduct by the party asserting the statute
since these defenses or exceptions were not mentioned specifically in the statute
of frauds.9 6 The Britten court, therefore, held that the court correctly allowed
the application of promissory estoppel to cases involving the Iowa version
of the UCC statute of frauds. 97
Although a split of authority remains as to whether promissory estoppel
may operate in UCC statute of frauds cases, the Fourth Circuit reached the
correct result and joined the growing majority of courts that have applied
the doctrine of promissory estoppel to cases involving the UCC's statute of
frauds.9 8 Although many courts have noted correctly that the UCC statute
of frauds does not mention the doctrine of promissory estoppel,"9 the statute's
silence should not preclude a court's use of the doctrine to enforce an oral
promise within the statute's terms.' The UCC statute of frauds' silence on
the use of estoppel could suggest that the draftsmen of the UCC did not in-
tend to displace promissory estoppel but intended to leave the ultimate disposi-
tion of the question to the courts."0 ' Furthermore, the supplementary general
principles provision of the UCC specifically provides that the law of estoppel
shall supplement the Code unless particular provisions of the UCC displace
the general principles.0 " In light of the supplementary general principles pro-
vision, the draftsmen of the UCC may have decided that stating the rules of
promissory estoppel in the UCC's statute of frauds section would be un-
necessary or redundant.' 3 Prior to the UCC, many courts recognized pro-
missory estoppel as a means of circumventing the statute of frauds and the




98. See supra text accompanying notes 84-97 (discussion of cases holding promissory estop-
pel applies to cases involving UCC statute of frauds); see also Edwards, supra note 6, at 221
(majority of courts support interpretation that promissory estoppel may supplement UCC statute
of frauds); Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Virginia Metal Indus., 708 F.2d 930, 932-34 (4th Cir.
1983) (promissory estoppel binds parties to oral contract despite North Carolina's version of UCC
statute of frauds).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48 (discussion of cases where courts relied on
literal reading of exceptions specifically listed in UCC statute of frauds.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 101-104 (reasons why UCC statute of frauds' silence
on use of promissory estoppel should not preclude doctrine's use).
101. See Edwards, supra note 6, at 221 (UCC's silence in § 2-201 concerning promissory
estoppel indicates legislative intent to leave issue to courts).
102. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978) (general principles provision which states that law of estop-
pel supplements UCC); see also Metzger & Phillips, supra note 8, at 97-98 (§ 1-103 standing
alone allows promissory estoppel and should end all controversy on issue); supra text accompany-
ing note 72 (general principles section states that law of estoppel supplements UCC).
103. See Edwards, supra note 6, at 221 (draftsmen saw no need to restate principle of pro-
missory estoppel in statute of frauds section).
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passage of the UCC indicates that the UCC draftsmen had no intentions of
precluding the use of promissory estoppel to enforce contracts involving the
UCC statute of frauds.
10 4
The courts that are concerned with the evidentiary purposes served by
the statute of frauds writing requirement assert that recognition of promissory
estoppel would result in the nullification of the statute.105 Those courts give
insufficient credence to the evidentiary value of the promisee's detrimental
reliance on the oral promise. 0 6 Fearing fraud on the part of the promisee,
these courts fail to recognize that if the courts disallow the use of promissory
estoppel and declare unenforceable any contract that fails to meet the terms
of the UCC statute of frauds, an unscrupulous promisor could use the statute's
writing requirement to defeat enforcement of an oral contract upon which
the parties have agreed and on which the promisee has relied to his detriment."0 7
Furthermore, the courts that have not distinguished older precedents
disallowing the use of promissory estoppel' ° have failed to realize that the
modern businessman habitually relies on oral contracts of sale. 09 Commer-
cial realities dictate that those relying on oral promises deserve the legal pro-
tection provided by the doctrine of promissory estoppel." 0 Not only should
a supplier expect a contractor to use the supplier's bid because the supplier
submitted the lowest estimate, but the contractor serves the supplier's best
interest in relying on the bid, receiving the overall contract, and awarding
the subcontract to the supplier."'
In addition to the sound reasons that support the Fourth Circuit's ruling
and refute the arguments advanced by the courts reaching results different
from the Fourth Circuit's holding, the Campbell decision clarifies North
Carolina law and renders the commercial code's statute of frauds inapplicable
when the general contractor successfully bids on a project relying on a sup-
104. See id. (no reason for draftsmen to think that courts would discontinue use of doctrine
of promissory estoppel after UCC).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 49-60 (discussion of cases in which courts stated
that allowing promissory estoppel would negate effect of UCC statute of frauds).
106. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 8, at 99 (courts that express concern about pro-
missory estoppel nullifying statute of frauds' evidentiary protections fail to recognize evidentiary
value of detrimental reliance).
107. See Edwards, supra note 6, at 221 (strict enforcement of UCC statute of frauds may
cause unconscionable injury or injustice); see also supra text accompanying note 96 (if promissory
estoppel were unavailable, court could not enforce oral contracts falling within terms of statute
of frauds despite unconscionable conduct by party asserting statute).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 61-69 (discussion of cases in which courts failed
to distinguish prior case law holding promissory estoppel unavailable in any statute of frauds case).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4 (process involved in accepting oral sub-bids in
construction contract cases).
110. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 8, at 103 (common business practices include reliance
on oral contracts); see also supra text accompanying notes 1-2 (contractors rely on oral price
quotes in bidding process for construction projects).
111. See Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, -. , 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958)
(in best interest of subcontractor for general contractors to use subcontractor's bid).
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